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Problem definition: When donors subsidize products for sale to low-income families, questions faced by
the donor include who should be subsidized in the supply chain and to what extent, and whether retail
competition, substitutable products, or demand uncertainty matter.
Academic/practical relevance: By introducing and analyzing “development supply chains” in which
transactions are commercial but subsidies are needed for affordability, we explore different supply chain
structures, with product substitution and retail competition motivated by a field study in Haiti of supply
chains of subsidized solar lanterns.
Methodology: We incorporate product substitution, retail competition, and demand uncertainty in a three-
echelon supply chain model with manufacturers, retailers and consumers. This model has transactions among
the donor, manufacturers, retailers and consumers as a 4-stage Stackelberg game and we solve different
variations of this game by using backward induction.
Results: The donor can subsidize the manufacturer, retailer or the customer, as long as the total subsidy
per unit across these echelons is at the optimal level. Having more product choice, especially with product-
specific subsidies, and having more retail-channel choice can increase the number of beneficiaries adopting
the products; this increase becomes more pronounced as demand becomes more uncertain.
Managerial implications: Donors must coordinate across different programs along the entire supply chain;
demand uncertainly only accentuates the need to do so. They must also encourage more retailers to enter
the market, to sell a diverse set of substitutable products, and to offer product-specific subsidies.
Key words : Subsidies, development supply chains, Haiti, socially responsible products, solar lanterns
1. Introduction
After a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, more than 200,000 people were
killed, more than 300,000 injured, and 1.5 million people rendered homeless. In our field study of solar
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lantern distribution in Haiti during 2014-2016, we found donors created subsidy programs for selling
‘essential’ products such as solar lanterns to the poor using what we call development supply chains, to
distinguish from humanitarian or commercial supply chains: We observed that there was no agreement
among donors or other stakeholders as to where subsidies should be provided in the supply chain and
whether or not competing products or supply chain entities should be subsidized.
This observation motivated these research questions: Where in the supply chain and how much should
the donors subsidize, keeping in mind the supply chain structure, product choice, retail competition, and
demand uncertainty? We assume the donor’s goal is to maximize the number of beneficiaries who can
afford the product subject to a budget. By considering a three-echelon supply chain with manufacturers,
retailers, and customers, we analyze different variants of a 4-stage Stackelberg game to seek answers by
considering the following settings: (1) the base setting with one retailer selling a single product; (2) a
choice setting with one retailer selling two substitutable products; and, (3) a competition setting with two
competing retailers selling two substitutable products separately. Furthermore, we add (4) endogenous
wholesale price, and (5) demand uncertainty to these three settings.
Comparing the corresponding equilibrium outcomes associated with different supply chain settings,
we find there is a unique optimal total subsidy level for each product in each setting. Also, we find that
it is optimal to subsidize any of the manufacturers, the retailers, or the beneficiaries, as long as the total
subsidy per unit is maintained at the optimal level. Moreover, we learn that a donor can stimulate more
beneficiaries to adopt the lanterns without increasing the budget by: (1) encouraging more heterogeneous
products with different valuations; (2) offering product-specific subsidies; and (3) encouraging more
retailers entering the market. These results become more pronounced when the underlying market
demand becomes more uncertain. In all settings with optimal subsidies, the retailers’ profits are positive
so subsidy programs, if optimal, create economic value for the micro-retailers, meeting development
goals of the donor. With these findings, we seek to contribute to the literature on the use of subsidies in
supply chains with our focus on supply chain structure. We also seek to contribute to the humanitarian
operations literature by presenting and analyzing subsidies for post-disaster recovery and development.
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Section 2 provides background for this work based on our field study. Section 3 analyzes subsidies
(per lantern) in three supply chain settings as the base model in which the wholesale price is exogenous.
Sections 4 and 5 extend the base model for two settings where: (1) the wholesale price is endogenously
determined by the manufacturer; and (2) the market size is uncertain. Section 6 highlights our contri-
bution to the literature and implications for practice as conclusion. Proofs for theorems appear in the
(online) Appendix.
2. Background Information
The development supply chains for solar lanterns we studied in Haiti (2014-16) have entities
at three echelons: (1) OEMs (e.g., d.light) who source the lanterns mainly from China, (2)
Importer/distributor/retailer who import the lanterns into Haiti and supply to distributors who sell
through retail chains or micro-retailers (who may be funded by micro-finance institutions), and (3) con-
sumers or beneficiaries. Some importers distribute multiple brands of solar lanterns through multiple
channels so product substitution and retail competition are present. Donors such as USAID offer unit
subsidies indirectly to micro-entrepreneurs by funding MFIs who offer lower interest rates than market
on loans to micro-entrepreneurs to buy solar lanterns from distributors. In our field study, we found
that donors typically provided lump-sum grants to OEMs, importers or distributors, but donor practice
in Bangladesh or India is to offer (unit) subsidies sold via cash vouchers. This papers focuses on unit
subsidies and we refer the reader to XXXX (2017) for the analysis associated with lump-sum grants.
Three key findings, which set the stage for modeling after this section, are:
1. The wholesale price: The wholesale price of solar lanterns sold in Haiti can be pre-specified (i.e.,
exogenous to the setting) or negotiated (i.e., endogenous to the setting). For certain brands of solar
lanterns imported directly from China, the price tends to be pre-specified for all countries. One senior
Manager of Solar Product Company told us that: “The norm is just like ‘business is business’ in China,
here’s our price.” However, the wholesale price of other brands is negotiable. Indeed, as one interviewee
(Founder and CEO of a Solar Product Company) put it, “[Negotiation] is country by country There are
times that we’ve negotiated pretty big distribution agreements that have a minimum one container per
month.”
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2. Number of brands: Some importers focus on a single brand while others prefer multiple brands
of solar lanterns with different perceived quality levels and price points. One importer in Haiti
told us that: “We always try to buy products approved by [World Bank-funded] Lighting Global
<www.lightingglobal.org>. It is [about] forming a relationship with one manufacturer, testing in-country
to see how well [the products] are accepted, and then negotiating prices.” However, the CEO of a dif-
ferent importer of solar lanterns said that: “It’s best to have a range of products – we have 12 different
products for different end customers at different price points and different feature sets.”
3. Donors’ objectives and budget: Donors use a planned budget to maximize the total adoption. For
instance, World Bank had a solar lantern project with a budget of $8.62 million in Haiti. A senior
manager at a donor organization said, “What counts is good quality products that are affordable, and
that they make a positive change to the beneficiaries.” A common goal is to maximize the number of
beneficiaries adopting solar lanterns subject to the donor’s budget.
Despite the common goal of maximizing the total adoption of solar lanterns, we found that donors
have divergent views on where to provide subsidies in the supply chain and what to subsidize. Even
within the same donor organization such as USAID, different units offer financial supports at different
echelons in the supply chain. This finding motivated us to better understand where and how much
should the donor subsidize in a (development) supply chain. To do so, we analyze the following three
supply chain settings, which we observed in our field study:
Supply chain setting 1: Selling a single product through a single retailer. In Setting 1, a
major distributor (Eneji Pwop) imports and sells Nokero’s solar lanterns directly to consumers through
micro-entrepreneurs (Figure 1). Nokero is a US-based company who sources its production from China
and sells its solar lanterns in over 120 countries. Eneji Pwop received indirect subsidies via zero- or
low-interest loans provided by Kiva.org (a non-profit crowdfunding-based impact investor). These micro-
entrepreneurs used micro loans from Kiva to purchase products and resell to low-income end customers
around Haiti.
Supply chain setting 2: Selling two substitutable products through a single retailer. Besides
Nokero’s solar lanterns, Eneji Pwop sells solar lanterns from another OEM, Greenlight Planet, a “for-
profit” social business (Figure 2). Greenlight Planet contracts with a manufacturer in China to produce
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Figure 1 One retailer, Eneji Pwop, selling product from Nokero
solar lanterns and solar home systems for sale in 54 countries. Greenlight Planet has received invest-
ments from a number of impact investors, including Bamboo Finance, the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), and Ashden. Eneji Pwop received indirect subsidies from Kiva.org as stated above.
(Notice from Figure 2 that the Greenlight Planet solar lanterns are distributed by Total Haiti - a division
of Total, the French oil-and-gas multinational.)
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Figure 2 One retailer, Earthspark Eneji Pwop, selling products from Greenlight Planet and Nokero
Supply chain setting 3: Selling two substitutable products separately through two compet-
ing retailers. In Haiti, MicamaSoley and Sogexpress are major distributors of d.light and Ekotek solar
lanterns, respectively (Figure 3). Solar lanterns from d.light have higher perceived quality because they
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are certified by Lighting Global. MicamaSoley sells d.light solar lanterns at wholesale prices to micro-
entrepreneur women who accept Fonkoze (or other subsidized) micro-loans. Fonkoze is a large Wash-
ington DC-based non-profit MFI who uses donor grants to supplement revenues from loans, enabling it
to offer micro-loans at low interest rates. Sogexpress distributes Ekotek’s solar lanterns using a similar
setup.
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Figure 3 Two retailers, MicamaSoley and Sogexpress, selling substitutable products from d.light and Ekotek
In the next section, we develop three separate models to analyze subsidies in these three settings. Our
goal is to determine the optimal subsidy strategy for donors to maximize the impact of their planned
budget when the wholesale price is exogenous. (We shall extend this to endogenous wholesale price in
Section 4.)
3. Base Model: Exogenous wholesale price
We present a stylized three-echelon model of those three supply chain settings as described in Section
2. In our model, we “aggregate” importers, distributors, and retailers all as “retailer” into a single
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echelon, and model “manufacturer" and “beneficiaries” in two separate echelons. The wholesale price
w is exogenous (as discussed in finding 1 of our field study). This occurs when the manufacturer has
established a common wholesale price w for different countries, and will not change its wholesale price
for the market in question due to “parallel imports arbitrage” concerns. Import cost and distribution
cost are taken to be zero; however, our analysis can be easily extended to including various costs: import
tax, logistics and distribution costs. To capture findings 2 and 3 of our field study in our base model,
the three supply-chain entities and the donor make the following decisions:
1. Given a planned budgetK, the donor selects the retailer subsidy sr and the beneficiary subsidy sb to
maximize product adoption. (Because the wholesale price w is exogenous in the base model, there is no
incentive for the donor to offer subsidy sm to the manufacturer because such subsidy will not support the
donor’s cause to increase product adoption. However, when the wholesale price is endogenous (Section
4), the donor may offer subsidy sm to the manufacturer.
2. When the wholesale price w is exogenous, the manufacturer is passive in the base model, but
becomes active in choosing the endogenous wholesale price w in an extension of the base model in
Section 4.
3. Given the subsidies (sr, sb) and the wholesale price w, the retailer sets its retail price p to maximize
its profit.
4. Given the subsidy sb and the retail price, each beneficiary decides whether to purchase the product
or not. To capture heterogeneity among customers (cf., Lilien et al. 2010), we assume beneficiaries
(consumers) value the product (e.g., d.light’s solar lantern) as v, where v∼U [0,1] so that beneficiaries
with v≥ (p− sb) will purchase the product.
We model the above interactions as a three-stage Stackelberg game when the wholesale price is
exogenous. (The analysis in Section 4 for endogenous wholesale price will involve a four-stage Stackelberg
game.) In this three-stage game, the donor is the leader who determines the subsidies (sr, sb) to be given
to the retailer and the beneficiary; respectively. Given these subsidies, the retailer is the follower who
sets the retail price p, and, finally, the beneficiaries decide whether to purchase the product or not. (In
Yu, Tang, Sodhi and Knuckles: Optimal subsidies for development
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Figure 4 Three supply chain settings: (1) single product, one retailer, (2) two substitutable products, one retailer,
(3) two substitutable products, each with separate retailer.
the base model, we scale the size of the beneficiary market M to 1, however, in Section 5, we extend
this analysis to the case where the market size M is uncertain with E(M) = 1.) In the remainder of
this section, we use backward induction to solve different variants of this 3-stage Stackelberg game by
considering three different supply chain structures (Figure 4) in which a single manufacturer sells: (1)
a single product through one retailer, (2) two substitutable products through one retailer, or (3) two
substitutable products separately through two competing retailers. For each setting, we determine the
optimal subsidy and the corresponding maximum product adoption. Then we compare these equilibrium
outcomes across these three settings.
Before we solve the Stackelberg game for each setting (Figure 4) with sm = 0 as the wholesale w is
exogenous, let us first formulate the donor’s problem involving two products (taking the single product
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case in setting 1 as a special case). Let D1 and D2 be the demand for product 1 and 2 so that the donor’s
total subsidy cost is equal to (sr1 + sb1)D1 + (sr2 + sb2)D2. Given a budget K, the donor’s problem is:
max(sr1,sr2;sb1,sb2) (D1 +D2) (1)
subject to (sr1 + sb1)D1 + (sr2 + sb1)D2 ≤K. (2)
Next, we analyze the donor’s problem for each setting as depicted in Figure 4.
3.1. Setting 1: Selling a single product through a single retailer
In setting 1 (Figure 4-1), the manufacturer sells one product through a single retailer. For any given
retail price p and subsidy sb, the product demand D = 1− (p− sb) because the beneficiary valuation
v∼U [0,1]. Anticipating this demand function along with any given subsidy sr, the retailer solves:
pir(sb, sr) = max
p
{[p− (w− sr)] · [1− (p− sb)]}, (3)
which yields optimal retail price p∗(sb, sr) satisfying:
p∗(sb, sr) =
1 +w
2 +
sb− sr
2 . (4)
The first term 1+w2 corresponds to the base retail price, and the second term represents the upward
(downward) adjustment in retail price in response to the subsidy (sr, sb).
It follows from (4) and D = 1− (p− sb), the corresponding D = 1−w2 + sb+sr2 so that the beneficiary
demand is increasing in the subsidies (sb, sr). To ensure that demand is always greater than 0 even when
there is no subsidy, we should assume w < 1. Similarly, we get pir(sb, sr) = (1−w+(sb+sr))
2
4 via substitution
so that the retailer’s profit is non-negative and increasing in the donor’s subsidies (sb, sr). By denoting
s ≡ sb + sr as the “total subsidy level”, we can express s = 2D − 1 + w. We assume the budget is
reasonably low so that the donor cannot use K to set subsidy s≥w so that the effect cost of the lantern
is essentially free. To ensure s < w, we assume that K < 12 ·w. By using s = 2D − 1 +w, the donor’s
problem (1) can be reformulated as:
max
D
D s.t. (2D− 1 +w) ·D≤K (5)
By noting that the adoption D and total subsidy cost (left hand side of the budget constraint) are
increasing in D, we can show that the budget constraint is binding and then obtain:
Yu, Tang, Sodhi and Knuckles: Optimal subsidies for development
10 Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. MSOM-17321
Proposition 1. When selling a single product through a single retailer, the optimal demand D∗ =
1−w+
√
(1−w)2+8K
4 and the optimal subsidy s
∗
b + s∗r ≡ s∗ = −(1−w)+
√
(1−w)2+8K
2 , where s
∗ is increasing in w
and K.
Proposition 1 implies that, although the optimal subsidies (s∗b , s∗r) are not unique to the supply
chain entities, the total subsidy value s∗ across the supply chain is uniquely defined. Also, when the
exogenous wholesale price w is higher, the donor will also increase its subsidy s∗ to compensate the
retailer/beneficiary accordingly. However, due to the binding budget constraint, a higher subsidy would
yield a lower demand D∗ as w increases.
The single product case yields two key results: (1) the budget constraint is binding, and (2) it does
not matter whether the donor subsidize the retailer or the beneficiary as long as the total subsidy s∗ is
maintained at the optimal level. We now examine whether these two results will hold in settings 2 and
3 (Figure 4), and examine which configuration would yield a higher product adoption.
3.2. Setting 2: Selling two substitutable products through a single retailer
When selling two substitutable products (Figure 4-2), we assume that these two products have different
beneficiary valuations, where v1 ∼ U [0,1], and v2 = δ · v1 with δ > 1. (We assume that the wholesale
price w2 > w1 to rule out product 2 dominating product 1 completely as a trivial case. Analogous to
setting 1, we also assume w1 < 1 and w2 < δ to ensure the demand of each product will not always be
0.) Because the wholesale price is product-specific, we consider the case where retail price pi and the
subsidies (sri , sbi) offered by the donor are product-specific, i= 1,2.
Consider the beneficiary purchasing decision for any given retail price pi and subsidy sbi for product
i= 1,2. By using the effective price (pi− sbi) and valuations of different products, a beneficiary will buy
product 1 if v1 > (p1 − sb1) and v1 − (p1 − sb1) > v2 − (p2 − sb2); buy product 2 if v2 > (p2 − sb2) and
v2− (p2− sb2)> v1− (p1− sb1); and buy nothing, otherwise. By using v1 ∼ U [0,1], v2 = δ · v1, demand
Di for either product i satisfies:
D1 =
(p2− sb2)− δ(p1− sb1)
δ− 1 , D2 = 1−
(p2− sb2)− (p1− sb1)
δ− 1 (6)
Yu, Tang, Sodhi and Knuckles: Optimal subsidies for development
Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. MSOM-17321 11
Anticipating the demand Di in (6) along with any given subsidy sri , the retailer solves: pir(sbi , sri ; i=
1,2) = maxp1,p2
∑2
i=1{(pi−(wi−sri)) ·Di}. It is easy to check then that the optimal retail price p∗i (sbi , sri)
for i= 1,2 satisfies:
p∗1(sbi , sri ; i= 1,2) =
1 +w1
2 +
sb1 − sr1
2 , p
∗
2(sbi , sri ; i= 1,2) =
δ+w2
2 +
sb2 − sr2
2 (7)
The optimal retail price possesses the same properties as the optimal price p∗ as stated in (4); we omit
details. Substituting p∗i into D1 and D2 and by denoting s1 ≡ sb1 + sr1 and s2 ≡ sb2 + sr2 , we get:
D1 =
δ(s1−w1)− (s2−w2)
2(δ− 1) , D2 =
(δ− 1)− (s1−w1) + (s2−w2)
2(δ− 1) . (8)
From (8), s1 = 2(D1 +D2) + (w1− 1) and s2 = 2(D1 + δD2) + (w2− δ). By considering donor’s budget
constraint s1D1 + s2D2 ≤K, the donor’s problem (1) can be reformulated as:
max
D1,D2
D1 +D2 s.t. [2(D1 +D2) + (w1− 1)] ·D1 + [2(D1 + δD2) + (w2− δ)] ·D2 ≤K. (9)
By noting that the objective function of (9) is increasing in both D1 and D2, the budget constraint
will be binding if the subsidy cost s1D1 + s2D2 (i.e., the left hand side of the budget constraint of
problem (9)) is also increasing in D1 and D2. By differentiating the subsidy cost function f1(D1,D2) =
2D21 + 2δD22 + 4D1D2 + (w1− 1)D1 + (w2− δ)D2 with respect to D1 and D2, we find that the function
is indeed increasing in D1 and D2. In this case, we can conclude that the donor’s budget constraint
is binding so that the budget constraint will satisfy as an equation. By treating the budget constraint
(9)) as a quadratic equation, we can determine the optimal D∗1 as a function of D2, getting D∗1 =
1
4 · [1 − w1 − 4D2 +
√
(4D2− 1 +w1)2− 8[D2(w2− δ) + 2D22δ−K]. Through substitution, the donor’s
problem (9) simplifies to a single-variable problem:
max
D2≥0
1
4 · [1−w1 +
√
(4D2− 1 +w1)2− 8[D2(w2− δ) + 2D22δ−K]. (10)
By solving this, we determine the optimal demand D∗2 and then retrieve D∗1 , getting:
Proposition 2. When selling two substitutable products through a single retailer, the donor’s optimal
subsidy s∗i and the corresponding optimal (D∗1 ,D∗2) satisfy:
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1. When δ − w2 > 1 − w1, (D∗1 ,D∗2) = (w2−δw14(δ−1) + 14
√
(w1−w2)2
δ−1 +w21 − 2w2 + δ+ 8K, (δ−w2)−(1−w1)4(δ−1) ),
(s∗1, s∗2) = ( 12(w1− 1 +
√
8K +w21 − 2w2 + (w1−w2)2δ−1 + δ), 12(w2− δ+
√
8K +w21 − 2w2 + (w1−w2)2δ−1 + δ));
2. When δ − w2 ≤ 1− w1, (D∗1 ,D∗2) = ( 14(1− w1 +
√
8K + (1−w1)2),0), and (s∗1, s∗2) = ( 12(w1 − 1 +√
8K + (1−w1)2), 12(1−w1 +
√
8K + (1−w1)2) +w2− δ).
Also, the total demand under setting 2: D∗1 +D∗2 ≥ 14(1−w1 +
√
8K + (1−w1)2).
Proposition 2 possesses structure similar to Proposition 1: the optimal subsidies (s∗bi , s
∗
ri
) are not unique
but the total subsidy per unit s∗i for product i is uniquely defined. Next, observe that the valuations
of products 1 and 2 are bounded above by 1 and δ and that the retail prices are bounded below by w1
and w2 (without subsidies), we can interpret (1−w1) and (δ−w2) as the maximum consumer surplus
for products 1 and 2; respectively. In this case, when (δ−w2)≤ (1−w1), the second statement reveals
that when product 2 offers a lower maximum surplus than product 1. Hence, there is no demand for
product 2 in equilibrium so that D∗2 = 0, and the problem reduces to the single product case as in setting
1. However, when (δ − w2) > (1 − w1), the first statement implies that both products have positive
demands in equilibrium and the last statement reveals that the total demand D∗1 +D∗2 is higher than
the demand obtained in the single product case as in Proposition 1 for setting 1. Proposition 2 implies
the two key results in setting 1, and even though the products are substitutable, offering product choice
to beneficiaries can increase the total demand in line with the donor’s goals.
Uniform subsidies. Instead of product-specific subsidies, let us examine a special case in which the
subsidy is uniform so that s1 = s2 = s. This special setting occurs in various situations as explained in
Taylor and Xiao (2014). By substituting s1 = s2 = s into (8), we can solve the simplified donor’s problem
(below) and obtain the following result:
max
s
s−w1 + 1
2 s.t. s ·
s−w1 + 1
2 ≤K (11)
Corollary 1. When the donor offers uniform subsidy, the optimal per unit subsidy s∗ =
−(1−w1)+
√
(1−w1)2+8K
2 and the total demand D
∗
1 +D∗2 =
1−w1+
√
8K+(1−w1)2
4 .
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Corollary 1 reveals that, relative to Proposition 1 in setting 1, the total demand for selling two products
(D∗1 +D∗2) is the same when the donor offers uniform subsidies. Combining this observation with the
above discussion about Proposition 2, we gain a new insight: When selling two substitutable products
through a single retailer, the increase in the total demand is not driven by offering more products to
the beneficiaries. Instead, the increase is driven by the product-specific subsidies.
3.3. Setting 3: Selling two products through two competing retailers
Consider the case when two substitutable products are sold separately through two competing retailers
(Figure 4-3), where v1 ∼U [0,1] and v2 = δ ·v1 with δ > 1. Noting that the beneficiary purchasing decision
is driven purely by the retail price pi and the subsidy sbi for product i= 1,2, it is easy to check that
the demand for each product is as shown in (6).
Anticipating the demand function Di as in (6) along with any subsidy sri , the retailer i’s problem can
be formulated as pii(sbi , sri ; i= 1,2) = maxpi{(pi− (wi− sri)) ·Di}. In this case, it is easy to check that
the “best response” functions are: p∗1(p2) =
(p2−sb2 )+δw1
2δ +
sb1−sr1
2 and p
∗
2(p1) =
(δ−1)+(p1−sb1 )+w2
2 +
sb2−sr2
2 .
By considering these two equations simultaneously, we obtain retailer i’s equilibrium retail price pei :
pe1 =
(δ− 1)− (s2−w2)− 2δ(s1−w1)
4δ− 1 + sb1 , p
e
2 =
2δ(δ− 1)− 2δ(s2−w2)− δ(s1−w1)
4δ− 1 + sb2 (12)
where si ≡ sbi +sri . By substituting pei into D1 and D2 given in (6), it can be shown that the equilibrium
demand for each product i can be expressed as:
D1 =
δ(δ− 1)− δ(s2−w2) + δ(2δ− 1)(s1−w1)
(4δ− 1)(δ− 1) , D2 =
2δ(δ− 1) + (2δ− 1)(s2−w2)− δ(s1−w1)
(4δ− 1)(δ− 1) (13)
By using (D1,D2) given above, we can express subsidy s1 = 2δ−1δ D1 +D2 + (w1−1) and s2 =D1 + (2δ−
1)D2 + (w2− δ). By using the same approach as before, the donor’s problem can be simplified as:
max
D1,D2
D1 +D2 s.t.
2δ− 1
δ
D1
2 + 2D1D2 + (2δ− 1)D22 + (w1− 1)D1 + (w2− δ)D2 ≤K (14)
Like before, we show that the subsidy cost (i.e., the left hand side of (14)) is increasing in D1 and D2
so that the budget constraint is binding. By using this result, we get:
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Proposition 3. When selling two substitutable products through two competing retailers, the optimal
demand (D∗1 ,D∗2) satisfies 2δ−1δ D
∗
1
2 + 2D∗1D∗2 + (2δ− 1)D∗22 + (w1− 1)D∗1 + (w2− δ)D∗2 =K so that the
corresponding optimal subsidy s∗i satisfies the binding budget constraint. Moreover, the optimal subsidy
(s∗bi , s
∗
ri
) are not unique, but the total subsidy per unit s∗i for product i is uniquely determined.
For setting 3, Proposition 3 implies that the two key results obtained from the single product case in
setting 1 continue to hold: it does not matter whether the donor subsidizes the retailer or the beneficiaries
as long as the optimal subsidy is maintained at the optimal level.
By comparing the outcome of setting 2 and setting 3, we can obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Selling two substitutable products through two competing retailers instead of a single
retailer can achieve a higher total demand (i.e., D∗1 +D∗2).
Corollary 2 implies that the total demand reach can be increased further by when the manufacturer sells
its substitutable products through two competing retailers. Also, Corollary 2 and Proposition2 show
that both retailer competition and having substitutable products can help to increase total demand. As
such, the donor should (1) offer different (optimal) subsidies to different products; (2) encourage more
retailers to distribute the products to increase adoption of essential products.
Uniform Subsidies. When the donor offers the same subsidy across products with s1 = s2 = s, using
(13), the donor’s problem becomes:
max
s
3δ+ (s−w2) + 2δ(s−w1)
4δ− 1 s.t. s ·
3δ+ (s−w2) + 2δ(s−w1)
4δ− 1 ≤K (15)
and we obtain:
Corollary 3. When the donor offers uniform subsidies, the optimal subsidy s∗ is lower in setting
3 with two competing retailers than in setting 2 with one retailer. However, the total demand D∗1 +D∗2
is higher in setting 3 than in setting 2.
Recall from Corollary 1 that the donor cannot increase the total demand relative to setting 1 if it offers
uniform subsidies in setting 2. In contrast, Corollary 3 above states that, even when the donor offers
Yu, Tang, Sodhi and Knuckles: Optimal subsidies for development
Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. MSOM-17321 15
uniform subsidies in Setting 3, the donor can still increase the total demand, relative to settings 1 and 2,
by selling two products through two competing retailers. Therefore, while substitutable products create
product-competition, selling them separately through two competing retailers in setting 3 intensifies
retail-competition and each retailer reduces its retail price. As such, the donor can afford to reduce its
uniform subsidy s∗ in setting 3. However, because the budget constraint is binding with s∗ · (D∗1 +D∗2) =
K, total demand will increase even as the unit subsidy s∗ decreases.
In summary, our base model offers the following insights: (1) the optimal per unit subsidy is not
unique: the donor can offer per unit subsidy to the retailers and/or to the beneficiaries, as long as the
total subsidy per unit is set at a certain optimal level; (2) by introducing substitutable products, the
donor can increase the total reach of the products; however, product-specific subsidies (not uniform
subsidies) is effective for boosting the total demand; (3) the donor should support a supply chain
structure embedded with retail-competition to further boost total demand. Recognizing the fact that
these insights rely on the assumptions: (a) exogenous wholesale price; and (b) fixed market size M = 1.
We consider two extensions in the following two sections by relaxing these assumptions to see if these
results are robust.
4. Extension 1: Endogenous wholesale price
We now extend our base model to the case when the manufacturer sets its wholesale price to maximize
its profit, thus extending the 3-stage Stackelberg game earlier to a four-stage Stackelberg game involving
beneficiaries, the retailer, the manufacturer, and the donor as the leader and analyze the same three
supply chain settings (Figure 4).
4.1. Setting 1: Selling one product through a single retailer
For setting 1 of the model thus extended from setting 1 for the base model (Figure 4-1), we can show
that product demand D is equal to 1− (p− sb) for any given wholesale price w, subsidy (sm, sr, sb)
and retail price p. The retailer’s problem is the same as (3) so that the optimal price p∗ = 1+w2 +
sb−sr
2
and the corresponding demand D= 1−w2 +
sb+sr
2 remains the same as before. Anticipating this demand
function for any wholesale price w and unit cost c, and subsidy sm, the manufacturer solves:
pim = max
w
(w+ sm− c) ·
(1−w
2 +
sb + sr
2
)
(16)
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By showing that optimal wholesale price w∗ = 1+c2 +
s−sm
2 , the corresponding demand D =
1−c
4 +
sb+sr+sm
4 . By letting the total subsidy s
′ ≡ sb + sr + sm, the donor solves:
max
s′
D≡ 1− c4 +
s′
4 s.t. s
′ · (1− c4 +
s′
4 )≤K (17)
Because the objective function and the subsidy cost (i.e., left hand side of (17)) are increasing in s′, the
budget constraint is binding and we get:
Proposition 4. When selling one product through a single retailer and when the wholesale price is
endogenously determined by the manufacturer, the optimal total subsidy s′∗ = −(1−c)+
√
(1−c)2+16K
2 and
the optimal demand D∗ = (1−c)+
√
(1−c)2+16K
8 .
Proposition 4 is analogous to Proposition 1: the total subsidy per unit s′∗ is uniquely determined but the
optimal subsidies (s∗b , s∗r, s∗m) are not. Also, the optimal subsidy s′∗ is increasing in the production cost c
and the budget K, while the optimal total demand is decreasing in production cost c and increasing in
K. Moreover, “double marginalization” persists: the manufacturer’s profit pi∗m = 2(D∗)2, which is twice
that of the retailer pi∗r = (D∗)2 > 0.
4.2. Setting 2: Selling two products through a single retailer
We now consider Setting 2 as depicted in Figure 4-2. For any given wi and subsidy (smi, sri, sbi) for
product i, the retailer’s pricing problem is the same as Setting 2 as presented in Section 3.2: the retail
price p∗i is given in (7) and the corresponding demand function Di is given in (8). Hence, for any given
subsidy (sm1, sm2), the manufacturer solves:
max
w1,w2
∑
i=1,2
(wi + smi − ci) ·Di, (18)
where Di is given by (8) and ci is the per unit production cost. The optimal wholesale price w∗i satisfies:
w∗1 =
1
2(1 + c1 + s1− sm1), w
∗
2 =
1
2(c2 + s2− sm2 + δ) (19)
By substituting w∗1 and w∗2 into (8) and by denoting the total subsidy s′1 ≡ s1 + sm1 and s′2 ≡ s2 + sm2 ,
where s1 and s2 represent the total retailer and beneficiary subsidies as in the base case, we get:
D1 =
(c2− s′2) + (s′1− c1)δ
4(δ− 1) , D2 =
δ− 1 + (c1− s′1)− (c2− s′2)
4(δ− 1) (20)
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It follows from (20), we get: s′1 = −1 + c1 + 4(D1 +D2), s′2 = −δ + c2 + 4(D1 + δD2) so that we can
express the budget constraint s′1D1 + s′2D2 ≤K in terms of Di. Hence, the donor’s problem becomes:
max
D1,D2
D1 +D2 s.t. [−1 + c1 + 4(D1 +D2)] ·D1 + [−δ+ c2 + 4(D1 + δD2)] ·D2 ≤K (21)
By using the same argument as presented in Section 3.2, we can show that the budget con-
straint is binding so that the optimal demand (D∗1 ,D∗2) satisfies 4(D∗1)2 + 4δ(D∗2)2 + 8D∗1D∗2 +
(c1 − 1)D∗1 + (c2 − δ)D∗2 = K. The binding budget constraint yields D∗1 = −D1 + 18 [1 − c1 +√
(−1 + c1 + 8D2)2− 16(4δD22 −K +D2(c2− δ)]. Through substitution, the donor’s problem can be fur-
ther simplified:
max
D2≥0
1
8[1− c1 +
√
(−1 + c1 + 8D2)2− 16(4δD22 −K +D2(c2− δ)] (22)
Proposition 5. When selling two substitutable products through a single retailer and when the whole-
sale price is endogenous, we get:
1. When δ− c2 > 1− c1, D∗1 = c2−c1δ8(δ−1) + 18
√
c21− 2c2 + 16K + (c1−c2)2δ−1 + δ, D∗2 = δ−c2−(1−c1)8(δ−1) ; and
2. When δ− c2 ≤ 1− c1, D∗1 = 18 [(1− c1) +
√
(1− c1)2 + 16K], D∗2 = 0.
Also, the optimal total subsidy level (s′∗1 , s′∗2 ) = (−1 + c1 + 4(D∗1 +D∗2),−δ+ c2 + 4(D∗1 + δD∗2)).
Analogous to Proposition 2, Proposition 5 suggests that the structural results remain the same even
when the wholesale price is endogenous; i.e., (a) the optimal subsidies (s∗bi , s
∗
ri
, s∗mi) are not unique but
the total subsidy per unit s′∗i for product i is uniquely defined; and (2) the total demand under setting
2 (i.e., D∗1 +D∗2) will always be greater than the total demand under setting 1 with one product (i.e.,
D= 14(1− c1 +
√
8K + (1− c1)2).
Uniform subsidies. When the donor offers uniform subsidies so that s′1 = s
′
2 = s
′ , we can use the same
approach as before to get:
Corollary 4. When selling two substitutable products through a single retailer and when the donor
offers uniform subsidy across both products, the optimal per unit subsidy s′∗ = −(1−c1)+
√
(1−c1)2+16K
2 , and
the total demand D∗1 +D∗2 =
(1−c1)+
√
(1−c1)2+16K
8 .
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Observe that Corollary 4 is analogous to Corollary 1: when selling two products through one retailer
by using uniform subsidy, the donor cannot increase the total demand. Hence, the result obtained from
Setting 2 in the based model continued to hold: the increase in the total demand is driven by the
product-specific subsidy, not by having more products.
4.3. Setting 3: Selling two products separately through two competing retailers
By noting that this setting is akin to Setting 3 as presented in Section 3.3, one can check that the
retailer’s pricing problem is the same as in Section 3.3. So the retail price p∗i is given by (12) and the
corresponding demand function Di is given by (13), where s1 ≡ sb1 + sr1 and s2 ≡ sb2 + sr2 . In this case,
the manufacturer’s problem is maxw1,w2
∑
i=1,2(wi+ smi− ci) ·Di. Also, the optimal wholesale price and
the the corresponding demand satisfy:
w∗1 =
1
2(1 + c1 + s1− sm1), w
∗
2 =
1
2(δ+ c2 + s2− sm2), (23)
D1 =
δ[δ− 1− (s′2− c2) + (2δ− 1)(s′1− c1)]
2(δ− 1)(4δ− 1) , D2 =
2δ(δ− 1) + (2δ− 1)(s′2− c2) + δ(s′1− c1)
2(δ− 1)(4δ− 1) , (24)
where s′1 ≡ s1 + sm1 and s′2 ≡ s2 + sm2 . Through (24), we can express s′1 and s′2 as: s′1 = c1− 1 + 2[(2−
1
δ
)D1 +D2] and s′2 = c2− δ+ 2[D1 + (2δ− 1)D2] so that the donor’s problem can be written as:
max
D1,D2
D1 +D2 s.t. (c1− 1 + 2[(2− 1
δ
)D1 +D2]) ·D1 + (c2− δ+ 2[D1 + (2δ− 1)D2]) ·D2 ≤K (25)
As before, by showing that the subsidy cost (i.e., left hand side (25)) is increasing in D1 and D2, we get:
Proposition 6. When selling two substitutable products separately through two competing retailers
and when the wholesale price is endogenous,
1. the donor’s budget constraint (25) is binding;
2. The optimal subsidy (s∗bi , s
∗
ri
, s∗mi) are not unique but the total subsidy per unit s
′∗
i for product i is
uniquely determined; and
3. Selling through two competing retailers will generate a higher total demand than selling through a
single retailer.
Furthermore, when the donor offers uniform subsidies, the optimal subsidy (i.e., s1 = s2 = s), the optimal
subsidy s′∗ = −(3δ−c2−2δc1)+
√
(3δ−c2−2δc1)2+4(4δ−1)(2δ+1)K
2(2δ+1) and the corresponding total demand D
∗
1 +D∗2 =
3δ−c2−2δc1+
√
(3δ−c2−2δc1)2+4(4δ−1)(2δ+1)K
2(4δ−1) .
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Proposition 6 shows that the donor can achieve a higher product adoption in Setting 3 than in Setting
2. In summary, when the wholesale price is endogenous, the results from the base model continued to
hold: (1) the budget constraint is binding; (2) it does not matter who to subsidize as long as the total
subsidy s′i is maintained at the optimal level; (3) product-specific subsidies can enable the donor achieve
a higher demand; and (4) retail competition can enable the donor to generate a higher demand.
5. Extension 2: Market Uncertainty
Instead of assuming that the market size M = 1 in the base model, we now extend our base model to
the case when M follows a probability density function f(m) with m ∈ (0,∞). Following the modeling
approach of Taylor and Xiao (2014), there are five steps:
1. The donor determines and announces the subsidies sk for entity k = r, b.
2. The retailer knows the density function f(m) and selects the order quantity z.
3. The retailer observes the realized market size M =m.
4. The retailer decides on the retail price p by taking the order quantity z and the realized market
size m into consideration.
5. The beneficiary demand D is realized.
This extension is more complex because, as noted in Steps 2 that the retailer selects the order quantity
“before”, but he decides on the retail price “after” the market size is realized as in Step 4. To solve
the 3-stage Stackelberg game for each of the three settings, we use backward induction beginning with
Step 5 and ending with Step 1. In the remainder of this section, we first characterize the optimal total
subsidy level for each setting for the case when the probability density function f(m) of the market
size M is continuous. Then, by considering the case when the market size M follows the uniform or the
normal distribution, we show numerically that the key results obtained from the base model continued
to hold.
5.1. Setting 1: Selling one product through one retailer
Consider Setting 1 as depicted in Figure 4-1 (base case with sm = 0). For any given subsidy sb, any
realized market size m and any retail price p, the beneficiary demand (in step 5) is given by D =
(1− p+ sb) ·m.
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Retailer’s pricing problem. Observe from step 4 that the retailer’s pricing problem takes place “after”
the order z is placed and the market size m is realized. Therefore, the ordering cost w · z is sunk, the
actual sales S = min{D,z}, where D= (1− p+ sb) ·m, and the retailer’s pricing problem for any given
subsidy sr is: maxp (p+ sr) ·min{(1− p+ sb) ·m, z}, which can be reformulated as:
max
p
(p+ sr) · (1− p+ sb) ·m s.t. (1− p+ sb) ·m≤ z. (26)
By solving the above problem, the optimal price satisfies:
p∗ =

1+sb−sr
2 if m≤ 2z1+sb+sr
1 + sb− zm if m≥ 2z1+sb+sr
(27)
By denoting the total subsidy s≡ sb + sr, the corresponding sale S = min{D,z} and the retailer’s per
unit revenue p∗+ sr are:
S =

1+s
2 ·m if m≤ 2z1+s
z if m≥ 2z1+s
, p∗+ sr =

1+s
2 if m≤ 2z1+s
1 + s− z
m
if m≥ 2z1+s
(28)
Retailer’s ordering problem. Observe that the sales S and the retailer’s revenue (p∗+ sr ) depends
only on the total subsidy s. Hence, it suffices to focus on s only when we examine the retailer’s ordering
that takes place “before” the market size is realized as in step 2. For any given per unit total subsidy
s= sr + sb, the retailer’s (ex-post) profit is:
Πr(m) = (p∗+ sr) ·S−w · z =

( 1+s2 )
2 ·m−w · z if m≤ 2z1+s
(1 + s− z
m
−w) · z if m≥ 2z1+s
. (29)
To maximize the retailer’s (ex-ante) expected profit, the retailer’s ordering problem is:
max
z
Em[Πr(m)] =
∫ 2z
1+s
0
[(1 + s2 )
2m−wz]f(m)dm+
∫ ∞
2z
1+s
(1 + s− z
m
−w)zf(m)dm. (30)
By differentiating Em[Πr(m)] with respect to z and by applying the Leibniz rule, we get:
∂Em[Πr(m)]
∂z
=
∫ ∞
2z
1+s
(1 + s− 2z
m
) · f(m)dm−w
By considering the first order condition and by using the implicit function theorem, we get:
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Proposition 7. When selling one product through one retailer, the retailer’s optimal ordering deci-
sion z∗ satisfies
∫∞
2z∗
1+s
(1 + s− 2z∗
m
) · f(m)dm−w= 0. Also, the optimal order quantity z∗ is increasing in
the donor’s subsidy s and decreasing in the wholesale price w.
Donor’s problem. By substituting the optimal retailer’s ordering quantity z = z∗ given in Proposition
7 into the sales function S as given above, the expected sale S is:
EM [S] =
∫ 2z∗
1+s
0
(1 + s2 m)f(m)dm+
∫ ∞
2z∗
1+s
z∗f(m)dm= 1 + s2 E[M ]−
1
2
∫ ∞
2z∗
1+s
[((1 + s)m− 2z∗)f(m)]dm,
(31)
where
∫∞
2z∗
1+s
[(1 + s− 2z∗
m
) · f(m)]dm=w. As such, the donor’s problem in step 1 can be written as:
max
s
EM [S] s.t. s ·EM [S]≤K. (32)
Proposition 8. When selling one product through one retailer, the donor’s budget constraint is
binding so that the optimal subsidy s∗ satisfies s∗ ·EM [S] =K. Also, the donor’s optimal subsidy s∗ is
increasing in the budget K and the wholesale price w.
Proposition 8 reveals that even when market size is uncertain, the key results obtained in the base case
in Section 3.1 continue to hold.
5.2. Setting 2: Selling two substitutable products through one retailer
We now consider setting 2 (Figure 4-2) corresponding to the base case with sm1 = sm2 = 0. To obtain
tractable results, we focus on the following scenario: (a) the donor offers uniform subsidies so that the
subsidy is product-independent; (b) product 1 has a long replenishment lead time so that the retailer
needs to place the order z1 “before” the market size is realized. However, product 2 has a short lead
time so that the retailer can place the order z2 “after” the market size is realized. (Observe that this
scenario can occur when product 1 is sourced from afar and product 2 is sourced nearby.)
In the remainder of this section, we shall analyze settings 2 and 3 as depicted in Figure 4-2 and
Figure 4-3 by focusing on this scenario. We begin with step 5. For any given wholesale price, per
unit subsidy, market size, and retail price, the demand function is equal to (6) multiplied by m: D1 =
m · (p2−sb2 )−δ(p1−sb1 )
δ−1 , D2 =m · [1−
(p2−sb2 )−(p1−sb1 )
δ−1 ].
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Retailer’s pricing problem. Recall that the retailer’s pricing problem in step 4 occurs after the order
z1 is placed and the market size m is realized. Hence, the ordering cost for product 1; i.e., w1 · z1 is
sunk, and the actual sales for product 1 is S1 = min{D1, z1}, where D1 =m · (p2−sb2 )−δ(p1−sb1 )δ−1 . However,
because product 2 is ordered after the market size is realized, z∗2 = D2 = S2. Hence, we only need to
determine the optimal order quantity for product 1. For any given subsidy sr for the retailer, we can
use the same approach as in setting 1 to show that the retailer’s pricing problem is maxp1,p2 (p1 + sr1) ·
S1 + (p2 + sr2 −w2) ·S2, which can be reformulated as:
max
p1,p2
(p1 + sr1) ·D1 + (p2 + sr2 −w2) ·D2 s.t. D1 ≤ z1. (33)
By considering the first order condition and by defining a thresholdM1 = 2z1(δ−1)δs1+w2−s2 , the optimal retail
price (p∗1, p∗2) and the corresponding sale (S1, S2) satisfy:
p∗1 =

1
2(1 + sb1 − sr1) if m≤M1
1
2mδ [−2z1(δ− 1) +m(δ+w2− s2 + 2sb1δ)] if m>M1
, p∗2 =
1
2(sb2 − sr2 +w2 + δ) (34)
S1 =

m · δ·s1+w2−s22(δ−1) if m≤M1
z1 if m>M1
, S2 =

m · δ−1−s1+s2−w22(δ−1) if m≤M1
1
2δ · [−2z1 +m(s2−w2 + δ)] if m>M1
(35)
Retailer’s ordering problem. From (34) and (35), the retailer’s profit in step 2 can be written as:
Πr(m) = (p∗1 + sr1) ·S1−w1z1 + (p∗2 + sr2 −w2) ·S2
=

m
4(δ−1) [(s2−w2)(s2−w2− 2(s1 + 1) + (s21− 1 + 2s2− 2w2)δ+ δ2]−w1z1 if m≤M1
1
4mδ [−4z21(δ− 1) +m2(s2−w2 + δ)2− 4mz1(s2−w2− δ(s1−w1))] if m>M1.
By letting Πr,1(m) and Πr,2(m) be Πr(m) when m ≤M1 and m > M1; respectively, the retailer’s
(ex-ante) expected profit is:
EM [Πr(m)] =
∫ M1
0
Πr,1(m) · f(m)dm+
∫ ∞
M1
Πr,1(m) · f(m)dm. (36)
Hence, the retailer’s ordering problem is: maxz1 EM [Πr(m)], and
∂EM [Πr(m)]
∂z1
=
∫ M1
0
(−w1) · f(m)dm+
∫ ∞
M1
[−2z1(δ− 1)
mδ
− 1
δ
((s2−w2)− (s1−w1)δ)] · f(m)dm.
By considering the first order condition and by applying the implicit function theorem, we get:
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Proposition 9. When selling two substitutable products through one retailer, the retailer’s optimal
order quantity for product 1 z∗1 satisfies
∫∞
2z∗1(δ−1)
δs1+w2−s2
[−2(δ−1)z
∗
1
mδ
+ δs1−s2+w2
δ
] ·f(m)dm−w1 = 0, where z∗1 is
increasing in s1 and w2 and decreasing in s2 and w1.
Donor’s problem. When the donor offers uniform subsidy so that s1 = s2 = s, we can use the optimal
order quantity z∗1 given in Proposition 9 along with the sales function given in (35) to show that the
expected total sales is:
EM [S1 +S2] =
∫ M1
0
s+ 1
2 ·m · f(m)dm+
∫ ∞
M1
(δ− 1
δ
z∗1 +
m(s−w2 + δ)
2δ ) · f(m)dm. (37)
Given the budget K, the donor’s problem in step 1 is:
max
s
EM [S1 +S2] s.t. EM [s · (S1 +S2)]≤K (38)
Proposition 10. When selling two substitutable products through one retailer, the donor’s bud-
get constraint is binding: the optimal subsidy s∗ satisfies s∗ · [∫ 2z∗1(δ−1)s∗(δ−1)+w20 s∗+12 · m · f(m)dm +∫∞
2z∗1(δ−1)
s∗(δ−1)+w2
( δ−1
δ
z∗1 +
m(s∗−w2+δ)
2δ ) · f(m)dm] =K.
When the market size is uncertain, the key results obtained in the base case as presented in Section 3.2
continued to hold.
5.3. Setting 3: Selling two substitutable products separately through two retailers
Consider Setting 3 as depicted in Figure 4-3 (base case with sm1 = sm2 = 0). By considering the same
scenario as described in the last subsection, we can show that for any given wholesale price, per unit
subsidy, market size, and retail price, the demand function in step 5 is given in (13) multiplied by m.
Because the order for product 1 (i.e., z1) is placed by retailer “before” the market size is realized, the
sales for product 1 is given by S1 = min{D1, z1}. However, retailer 2 can postpone it ordering decision
of product 2 “after” the market size is realized so that z∗2 =D2 and the sales for product 2 is equal to
S2 =D2. It remains to focus on retailer 1’s order quantity z1.
Retailers’ pricing problem. By using the same arguments as presented in the last subsection for
setting 2, retailers’ pricing problem in step 4 can be formulated as follows:
max
p1
(p1 + sr1) ·D1 s.t. D1 =m ·
(p2− sb2)− δ(p1− sb1)
δ− 1 ≤ z1,and
max
p2
(p2 + sr2 −w2) ·m · [1−
(p2− sb2)− (p1− sb1)
δ− 1 ]. (39)
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By solving the above two pricing problems simultaneously and by defining a threshold for m as M2 =
z1·(δ−1)·(4δ−1)
(1+2s1)δ2−δ(1+s1+s2−w2) , the equilibrium retail price and the equilibrium sales satisfy:
p∗1 =

1+sb1+s2−w2−δ−2δ·sb1+2δ·sr1
1−4δ if m≤M2
m(−1−sb1−s2+w2+δ+2δsb1 )−2z1(δ−1)
m(2δ−1) if m>M2
, p∗2 =

sb2 (1−2δ)+δ(2+s1+2sr2−2w2−2δ)
1−4δ if m≤M2
z1(1−δ)+m(sb2 (δ−1)+δ(δ−1−sr2+w2))
m(2δ−1) if m>M2,
(40)
S1 =

m · −δ(1−w2+s1+s2)+(1+2s1)δ2(δ−1)(4δ−1) if m≤M2
z1 if m>M2
, S2 =

m · w2−(2+s1+2w2)·δ+2δ2+(2δ−1)·s2(δ−1)(4δ−1) if m≤M2
−z1+m(s2−w2+δ)
2δ−1 if m>M2
(41)
Retailer’s ordering problem. Because retailer 2 can postpone its ordering decision of product 2 until
after the market size is realized, the order quantity z∗2 =D2 = S2. It remains to solve retailer 1’s ordering
problem for product 1 in step 2. For any order quantity z1, we can use the retail price p∗1 and the sales
of product 1 S1 as stated above to compute retailer 1’s (ex-post) profit for selling product 1, where:
Πr1(m) = (p∗1 + sr1) ·S1−w1z1 =

mδ(1+s1+s2−w2−δ−2s1δ)2
(1−4δ)2(δ−1) −w1z1 if m≤M2
(s1 + w2−1+δ−s22δ−1 +
2z1(1−δ)
m(2δ−1) −w1) · z1 if m>M2
(42)
As before, we use Πr1,1(m) and Πr1,2(m) to represent the profit of retailer 1 under the cases when
m≤M2 and m≥M2; respectively. Hence, retailer 1’s (ex-ante) expected profit is:
EM [Πr1(m)] =
∫ M2
0
Πr1,1(m) · f(m)dm+
∫ ∞
M2
Πr1,2(m) · f(m)dm, (43)
and retailer 1’s ordering problem is: maxz1 EM [Πr1(m)].
Proposition 11. When selling two substitutable products through two separate retailers, retailer 1’s
optimal ordering quantity z∗1 satisfies
∫∞
z∗1 ·(δ−1)·(4δ−1)
(1+2s1)δ2−δ(1+s1+s2−w2)
(s1 + w2−1+δ−s22δ−1 +
4z∗1 (1−δ)
m(2δ−1) ) ·f(m)dm−w1 = 0.
Donor’s problem. When the donor offers uniform subsidy with s1 = s2 = s, we can use sales functions
given above to determine the expected total sale (i.e., EM [S1 +S2]). From (41) and formulate the donor’s
problem in step 1 as:
max
s
EM [S1 +S2] s.t. s ·EM [S1 +S2]≤K, where (44)
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EM [S1 +S2] =
∫ M2
0
3δ+ (s−w2) + 2δs
4δ− 1 ·m · f(m)dm+
∫ ∞
M2
2(δ− 1)z∗1 +m(s−w2 + δ)
2δ− 1 · f(m)dm (45)
By using the same approach as in Setting 2, we get:
Proposition 12. When selling two products through two separate retailers, the budge constraint is
binding: the donor’s optimal subsidy s∗ satisfies s∗ · [∫ z∗1 ·(δ−1)·(4δ−1)(1+2s∗)δ2−δ(1+2s∗−w2)0 3δ+(s∗−w2)+2δs∗4δ−1 ·m · f(m)dm+∫∞
z∗1 ·(δ−1)·(4δ−1)
(1+2s∗)δ2−δ(1+2s∗−w2)
2(δ−1)z∗1+m(s∗−w2+δ)
2δ−1 · f(m)dm] =K.
By reviewing the results presented in Propositions 8, 10, 12 in this section, we can conclude that,
when the market size is uncertain, our two key results obtained from the base model continued to hold;
namely, the donor can offer per unit subsidy to the retailers and/or to the beneficiaries, as long as the
total subsidy per unit is set at a certain optimal level; and the donor’s budget constraint is binding.
To complete our analysis, it remains to examine whether it is still true that the donor can increase the
total demand by introducing substituting products (as in Settings 2 and 3) and by supporting a supply
chain structure that entails retail competition (as in Setting 3).
Comparisons to examine these issues analytically are intractable as no closed-form expressions are
available for general probability distribution f(m) so we investigate numerically.
Numerical comparison. We consider four cases: (1) market size M is deterministic with m = 1;
(2) market size M ∼ N(1,0.04); (3) market size M ∼ N(1,0.09); (4) market size M ∼ U [0,2], noting
that E[M ] = 1 in all cases. In our numerical analysis, we set the exogenously given wholesale price as
w1 = 0.5 (for the single product in Setting 1, and for product 1 in Settings 2 and 3 when there are two
products), w2 = 0.8 (for product 2 in Settings 2 and 3), and set the valuation multiplier for product 2
δ = 1.2.
For each of these 4 cases, we compute the optimal uniform subsidy s∗ and the optimal expected total
sales S∗ by varying the budget K from 0 to 0.18. Our numerical results are summarized in Figures 5, 6,
7, and 8. In each figure, we depict the optimal subsidy s∗ on the left panel and the total expected sales
S∗ on the right panel.
We now observe:
Yu, Tang, Sodhi and Knuckles: Optimal subsidies for development
26 Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. MSOM-17321
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
K
s
Setting 1 & 2
Setting 3
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
K
sa
le
Setting 1 & 2
Setting 3
Figure 5 Optimal uniform subsidy (left) and the corresponding total sale (right) when the market size M is deter-
ministic with m= 1.
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Figure 6 Optimal uniform subsidy (left) and the corresponding total sale (right) when the market sizeM ∼N(1,0.04)
1. The optimal per unit subsidy s∗ is the lowest in setting 3, followed by that in setting 2. This implies
that the donor can afford to reduce its per unit subsidy s∗ when there are more product available in the
market (as in Setting 2), and can reduce the subsidy even further when there is retail competition (as
in setting 3).
2. Combining observation 1 above with our analytical observation that the budget constraint is bind-
ing in all three settings, we see that the optimal total sales is the highest in Setting 3, followed by Setting
2 for any given budget K.
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Figure 7 Optimal uniform subsidy (left) and the corresponding total sale (right) when the market condition M ∼
N(1,0.09)
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Figure 8 Optimal uniform subsidy (left) and the corresponding total sale (right) when the market condition M ∼
U [0,2]
3. Both the optimal subsidy s∗ and the total sale are increasing in the budget K under all three
supply chain structures.
4. When market size is deterministic, Figure 5 illustrates Corollary 1: when the donor offers uniform
subsidy, the donor cannot increase the total demand in setting 2. As discussed in Section 3, the increase
in the total demand in setting 2 is driven by product-specific subsidies, not by offering one more products.
This explains why the total demand are the same for both settings 1 and 2 (when the donor offers
uniform subsidy). However, as shown in Corollary 3, despite the “uniform subsidy” effect, Figure 5
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verifies that retail competition in Setting 3 can enable the donor to obtain a higher total demand even
when the donor offers uniform subsidy.
5. The variance of the market size M increases as we progress from Figure 6 to Figure 7, and from
Figure 7 to Figure 8. By comparing the total demand across Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8, we notice that the
result obtained in Corollary 1 for the deterministic case (Figure 5) is no longer valid when the market
size is uncertain. Specifically, s the variance of the market size M increases, the donor can obtain a
higher total demand by selling two products through one retailer in setting 2 compared to selling one
product through one retailer in setting 1 even when the donor offers uniform subsidy. Hence, product
choice can increase total demand further when the underlying market size is uncertain. The result in
Corollary 3 continues to hold when the market size is uncertain: retail competition can enable the donor
to obtain a higher total demand even when the market size is uncertain.
We conclude from these observations that the results obtained in the base model are robust in that
they continue to hold even when the market size is uncertain, More importantly, we find the demand
increase – in setting 3 over setting 2 and the in setting 2 over setting 1 – becomes more pronounced
when the market size becomes more uncertain.
6. Conclusion
We introduced development supply chains as a ‘hybrid of commercial and humanitarian supply chains.
Using three settings of three-echelon stylized supply-chain model, we modeled competition among donor,
manufacturers, retailers and consumers as a 4-stage Stackelberg game. These settings incorporated
product substitution, retail competition, and demand uncertainty. Results from different variations of
this game obtained using backward induction indicated that the donor can subsidize any echelon as long
as the total subsidy per unit is maintained at the optimal level. Having more product choice (especially
when the subsidies are product-specific) and more channel choice can increase the number of beneficiaries
adopting the products, and this increase is more pronounced as the market size becomes more uncertain.
Scholars have studied the question of subsidizing manufacturers or consumers in a variety of con-
texts with specific policy goals such as consumer welfare with: private and public firms (cf. Myles 2002;
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Poyago-Theotoky 2001; Scrimitore 2014); promotion of investment in a particular sector, say telecommu-
nication (cf. Jeanjean 2010); or promotion of environmental sustainability (cf. Bansal and Gangopadhyay
2003). Part of environmental sustainability (and energy security) is adoption of solar technology among
consumers (cf. Lobel and Perakis 2011; Cohen, Lobel, and Perakis 2016). There is also the rationale for
health of the poor with subsidies for malaria medication in many developing countries (cf. Levi et al.
2017; Taylor and Xiao 2014). Other contexts for subsidies include education (Schultz, 2004); electric-
ity (Goodarzi et al., 2015); food (Peeters and Albers, 2013); housing (Gilbert, 2004); and smallholders
farmers (Tang et al., 2015). As regards energy or lighting specifically, there is the question of empirically
establishing willingness to pay (Yoon et al. 2016), consumer adoption of alternative lighting products
(Uppari et al. 2017), and supply chain coordination for photovoltaic modules (Chen and Su, 2014).
Our work complements this literature by specifically analyzing product-specific subsidies in differ-
ent supply-chain settings with substitutable products and retail competition. For instance, Levi et al.
(2017) investigate uniform subsidies to competing manufacturers of drugs against malaria. Like us, the
donor’s goal is maximizing adoption but, we show that product-specific subsidies are better than uniform
subsidies in our context for the donor’s objective. Also, our scope is the entire supply chain and apart
from incorporating demand uncertainty. Rather than provide only upper bounds, we provide closed-
form solutions for optimal subsidy in the deterministic demand case and characterize the solution in the
uncertain demand case.
Shen et al. (2016) analyze how the Chinese government should subsidize home appliances for residents
in rural areas. We use a three-echelon model in contrast to their two-echelon subsidy model. Their
subsidies are a fixed percentage of the retail price across all products whereas we have product-specific
subsidies and in three different supply chain settings. Moreover, Shen et al. (2016) determine the optimal
percentage that maximizes consumer welfare, whereas we focus on total beneficiary demand, a common
measure for the effectiveness of a subsidy program. Furthermore, they assume deterministic demand
whereas we include the case of uncertain demand.
Goodarzi et al. (2015) study the interaction among the regulator, manufacturer and customers, focus-
ing on the optimal feed-in tariff policies of the regulator to minimize the grid operator’s total cost. In
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contrast, we seek to maximize product adoption under different supply-chain structures using unit sub-
sidies. Our paper also complements Taylor and Xiao (2014) by considering three different supply chain
settings with two substitutable products and two competing retailers in contrast to their one setting
with one product and one retailer. Doing so affords us a broader set of results.
A secondary contribution is to the humanitarian operations literature. Our work is motivated by the
example of Haiti following the 2010 earthquake. Supply chains such as one we presented help alleviate
poverty, and poverty alleviation in turn reduces vulnerability to future disasters and crises (Sodhi 2016,
Sodhi and Tang 2014, Van Wassenhove and Pedraza Martinez 2012). Post-disaster development as well
as poverty alleviation in general require supply chains to incorporate local communities (Hall and Matos
2010) to provide jobs and investment, and address institutional voids in low-income markets (Parmigiani
and Rivera-Santos 2015).
Our work has implications for donors to maximize adoption by beneficiaries:
1. Supply chain considerations: Donors must map out the supply chains of the products they want to
subsidize – echelons, substitutable products, and competition between retailers – and coordinate donor
action along these supply chain as well as those of intersecting supply chains.
2. Product choice and retailer competition: Donors must encourage competition in the distribution
channels and ensure there is a range of substitutable products across the quality-price range. Supporting
retailers who compete in offering these different products will further the donors’ objective .
3. Choice of subsidy target: While an important question for the donor is where to apply subsidies in
the supply chain for maximum effect, our work shows that the echelon does not matter so the decision
can be made only on the basis of echelon-specific transaction costs, e.g., in places with mobile money,
subsidizing end customers via their mobile money accounts may be an option.
4. Optimum subsidy: The donor must recognize there is an optimal level of subsidy – greater levels
may increase the number of potential consumers, but would only increase the donor’s investment and
possibly lower the profitability for the micro-entrepreneur retailer. Likewise, donors must take care not
to over-subsidize certain products to price out substitutes, something that has been observed in practice.
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Appendix A: Proof
Proof of Proposition 1 By considering the budget constraint, we can obtain that D ≤ 1−w+
√
(1−w)2+8K
4 . As
the objective function is increasing in D, we know that the optimal D∗ = 1−w+
√
(1−w)2+8K
4 . And we can then
calculate the optimal s∗ via substitution.
Proof of Proposition 2 By taking the first order derivative of f1(D1,D2) with respect to D1, D2, we get:
∂f1
∂D1
= 4(D1 +D2) + (w1− 1) = 2s1 + (1−w1) = 2(D1 +D2) + s1 > 0,
∂f1
∂D2
= 4(D1 + δD2) + (w2− δ) = 2s2 + (δ−w2) = 2(D1 + δD2) + s2 > 0,
from which we know that f1(D1,D2) is increasing in both D1 and D2. As the objective function D1 + k ·D2
is also increasing in both D1 and D2, we know that the optimal D∗1 and D∗2 should satisfy the binding budget
constraint (i.e., f1(D∗1 ,D∗2) =K). Next, by considering the first order condition of the objective function of the
donor’s problem given by (10), we obtain D∗2 =
(δ−w2)−(1−w1)
4(δ−1) . When δ−w2 ≥ 1−w1, then D∗2 is feasible, else
when δ−w2 < 1−w1, we can find that the objective function is always decreasing in D2 when D2 > 0, thus we
can obtain D∗2 = 0. As such, we can get the corresponding D∗1 and optimal subsidy (s∗bi , s
∗
ri
) via substitution.
Moreover, as (D∗1 ,D∗2) = ( 14 (1− w1 +
√
8K + (1−w1)2),0) is always a feasible solution of donor’s problem in
setting 2, we know that total demand in setting 2 D∗1 +D∗2 ≥ 14 (1−w1 +
√
8K + (1−w1)2).
Proof of Corollary 1 As the donor’s objective function and the expense are both increasing in s, it is easy
to check that the budget constraint should be binding at the optimal solution. By solving the binding bud-
get constraint, we obtain s∗ = −(1−w1)+
√
(1−w1)2+8K
2 . And we can obtain the corresponding D∗1 and D∗2 via
substitution.
Proof of Proposition 3 By denoting the subsidy cost (i.e., the left hand side of (14)) as f2(D1,D2) and by
taking the first order derivative of f2(·) with respect to D1, D2, we get:
∂f2
∂D1
= 2D1 · 2δ− 1
δ
+ 2D2 + (w1− 1) = 2s1 + (1−w1) = 2δ− 12δ ·D1 +D2 + s1 > 0,
∂f2
∂D2
= 2(2δ− 1)D2 + 2D1 + (w2− δ) = 2s2 + (δ−w2) = (2δ− 1)D2 +D1 + s2 > 0,
from which we know that f2(D1,D2) is increasing in both D1 and D2. As the objective function D1 +D2 is
also increasing in both D1 and D2, we know that the optimal D∗1 and D∗2 should satisfy the binding budget
constraint (i.e., f2(D∗1 ,D∗2) = K). Also, from (13), we know that Di only depends on the total subsidy si for
each product so that we can solve out the unique si based on the binding budget constraint, while the optimal
s∗bi and s
∗
ri
are not uniquely determined.
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Proof of Corollary 2 To achieve the same demand (D1,D2), the donor should spend f1(D1,D2) = 2D21 +
2δD22 + 4D1D2 + (w1− 1)D1 + (w2− δ)D2 in setting 2 and spend f2(D1,D2) = 2δ−1δ D21 + 2D1D2 + (2δ− 1)D22 +
(w1− 1)D1 + (w2− δ)D2 in setting 3. By comparing f1(D1,D2) and f2(D1,D2), we obtain:
f1(D1,D2)− f2(D1,D2) = (2− 2δ− 1
δ
) · (D21 + δD22) + 2D1D2 > 0.
Hence we know that to get the same (D1,D2), the donor needs to spend more money in a single retailer case (i.e.,
setting 2) than two competing retailers case (i.e., setting 3). Recall Proposition2 and 3, the optimal solutions of
the donor’s problem all satisfy the binding constraint. Therefore, we know that the optimal solution (D∗1,1,D∗1,2)
of setting 2 with a single retailer satisfies f1(D∗1,1,D∗1,2) =K. Meanwhile, we also know that f2(D∗1,1,D∗1,2)<K,
which means (D∗1,1,D∗1,2) is not the optimal solution of setting 3 with two competing retailers. As such, we know
that the optimal solution of setting 3 yields a greater total demand (i.e., the objective function D1 +D2) than
the optimal solution of setting 2.
Proof of Corollary 3 We use s(A) and s(B) to denote the optimal per uniform subsidy under setting 2 and
setting 3. It is easy to check that both the total demand and the donor’s expense given by (15) are both increasing
in the per unit subsidy s(B). Hence the budget constraint should be binding at the optimal solution. By solving
the binding budget constraint, we obtain the optimal s(B) = −(3δ−w2−2δw1)+
√
(3δ−w2−2δw1)2+4(4δ−1)(2δ+1)K
2(2δ+1) and the
corresponding total demand. We define the function s(a, b) =−a+√a2 + b, from which we can easily check that
s(a, b) is decreasing in a and increasing in b. And we obtain s(A) = s( 1−w12 ,2K) and s(B) = s(
3δ−w2−2δw1
2(2δ+1) ,
4δ−1
2δ+1K).
As δ −w2 > 1−w1, we can obtain that 1−w12 − 3δ−w2−2δw12(2δ+1) = −(δ−w2)+1−w12(2δ+1) < 0. Also, as 2K > 4δ−12δ+1K, we can
further obtain s(A) > s(B). As the total budget K is fixed and the budget constraint is binding, we can easily
get the total demand under setting 2 is lower than the setting 3.
Proof of Proposition 4 It is easy to check that the objective function D= 1−c4 +
s′
4 and the donor’s subsidy
cost s′ · ( 1−c4 + s
′
4 ) are both increasing in s′. Hence we know that the budget constraint is binding at the
optimal solution. By solving the binding budget constraint, we obtain s′ = −(1−c)+
√
(1−c)2+16K
2 and we then get
D∗ = (1−c)+
√
(1−c)2+16K
8 via substitution.
Proof of Corollary 4 When the donor offers the uniform subsidy across both products, then the donor’s
problem can be rewritten as:
max
s′
1− (c1− s′)
4
s.t. s′ · 1− (c1− s
′)
4 ≤K
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It is obvious that both the objective function and the total cost are increasing in s′ so that we can obtain the
budget constraint should be binding at the optimal solution. By solving the binding budget constraint, we get
s′∗ = −(1−c1)+
√
(1−c1)2+16K
2 and D∗1 +D∗2 =
(1−c1)+
√
(1−c1)2+16K
8 .
Proof of Proposition 5 By denoting f1(D1,D2) as the subsidy cost (i.e., the left hand side of (21)) and taking
the first order derivative, we obtain:
∂f1
∂D1
= [−1 + c1 + 4(D1 +D2)] + 4D1 + 4D2 = s′1 + 4(D1 +D2)> 0,
∂f2
∂D2
= [−δ+ c2 + 4(δD2 +D1)] + 4(D1 + δD2) = s′2 + 4(D1 + δD2)> 0.
Hence we know that for feasible s′1, s′2,D1,D2, the donor’s expense f1(D1,D2) is increasing in D1 and D2. As the
objective function D1 +D2 is also increasing in D1 and D2, we know the optimal (D∗1 ,D∗2) satisfies the binding
budget constraint (i.e., [−1+ c1 +4(D∗1 +D∗2)] ·D∗1 +[−δ+ c2 +4(D∗1 + δD∗2)] ·D∗2 =K). Next, by considering the
first order condition of donor’s objective function given by (22), we obtainD∗2 =
δ−c2−(1−c1)
δ(δ−1) . When δ−c2 ≥ 1−c2,
D∗2 > 0 so that we can further compute D∗1 = c2−c1δ8(δ−1) +
1
8
√
c21− 2c2 + 16K + (c1−c2)
2
δ−1 + δ via substitution. When
δ− c2 < 1− c2, δ−c2−(1−c1)δ(δ−1) < 0 so that the objective function is always increasing in D2 when D2 > 0. Hence we
get the optimal D∗2 = 0 and D∗1 = 18 (1− c1) +
√
(1− c1)2 + 16K.
Proof of Proposition 6 By denoting f2(D1,D2) as the subsidy cost (i.e., the left hand side of (25)) and taking
the first order derivative of f2(D1,D2) with respect to D1 and D2, we get:
∂f2
∂D1
= c1− 1 + 4D2 + (8− 4
δ
)D1 = s′1 + 2D2 + (4−
2
δ
)D1 > 0
∂f2
∂D2
= c2− δ+ 4D1 + (4δ− 2)D2 = s′2 + 2D1 + (4δ− 2)D2 > 0
Hence we know for feasible s′1, s′2,D1,D2, the donor’s expense f2(D1,D2) is increasing in D1 and D2. As the
objective function D1 +D2 is also increasing in D1 and D2, we obtain that the optimal (D∗1 ,D∗2) should satisfy
the binding budget constraint (i.e., (c1 − 1 + 2[(2− 1δ )D∗1 +D∗2 ]) ·D1 + (c2 − δ+ 2[D∗1 + (2δ− 1)D∗2 ]) ·D∗2 =K),
which is stated as the first statement of Proposition 6. Next, we know from (24) that Di only depends on
s′i, which also implies that the total subsidy per unit s′i for product i is uniquely determined but the optimal
subsidy (s∗bi , s
∗
ri
, s∗mi) are not unique. Finally, we show the third statement by the following. To achieve the same
demand (D1,D2), the donor should spend f1(D1,D2) in the setting 2 and spend f2(D1,D2) in the setting 3. By
comparing f1(D1,D2) and f2(D1,D2), we obtain:
f1(D1,D2)− f2(D1,D2) = 2
δ
D21 + 2D22 + 4D1D2 > 0.
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Hence we know that to get the same (D1,D2), the donor needs to spend more money in setting 2 than setting
3. As the optimal solutions of the donor’s problem all satisfy the binding constraint, we know that the optimal
solution (D∗1,1,D∗1,2) of setting 2 satisfies f1(D∗1,1,D∗1,2) =K. Meanwhile, we also know that f2(D∗1,1,D∗1,2)<K,
which means (D∗1,1,D∗1,2) is not the optimal solution of setting 3. As such, we know that the optimal solution of
setting 3 yields a greater total demand (i.e., D1 +D2) than setting 2.
When the donor offers the uniform subsidy across both products, the donor’s problem can be rewritten as:
max
s′
3δ+ (s′− c2) + 2δ(s′− c1)
4δ− 1 s.t. s
′ · 3δ+ (s
′− c2) + 2δ(s′− c1)
4δ− 1 ≤K
It is obvious that both the objective function and the total cost are increasing in s′ so that we can obtain the
budget constraint should be binding at the optimal solution. By solving the binding budget constraint, we get
s′∗ = −(3δ−c2−2δc1)+
√
(3δ−c2−2δc1)2+4(4δ−1)(2δ+1)K
2(2δ+1) and D∗1 +D∗2 =
3δ−c2−2δc1+
√
(3δ−c2−2δc1)2+4(4δ−1)(2δ+1)K
2(4δ−1) .
Proof of Proposition7 Then by taking the second order derivative of Em[Πr(m)] with respect to z and using
the Leibniz integral rule, we obtain
∂2Em[Πr(m)]
∂z2
=−
∫ ∞
2z
1+s
2
m
· f(m)dm< 0
Hence we know the expected profit function of the retailer is concave. Hence the optimal z∗ satisfies the
first order condition (i.e.,
∫∞
2z∗
1+s
(1 + s − 2z∗
m
) · f(m)dm − w = 0). We use g(z, s,w) to represent the function∫∞
2z∗
1+s
(1+s− 2z∗
m
) ·f(m)dm−w, and we have g(z∗, s,w) = 0. By taking the first order derivative of g(z, s,w) with
respect to z, s and w, we get:
∂g
∂z
=−
∫ ∞
2z
1+s
2
m
· f(m)dm< 0, ∂g
∂s
=
∫ ∞
2z
1+s
f(m)dm> 0, ∂g
∂w
=−1< 0
From the above, we know that g(z, s,w) is increasing in s and decreasing in z and w. Hence to ensure g(z∗, s,w) =
0, we can easily know that z∗ is increasing in s and decreasing in w.
Proof of Proposition 8 By taking the first order derivative of EM [S] with respect to s, we get:
∂EM [S]
∂s
=1 + s2 ·
2z∗
1 + s · f(
2z∗
1 + s ) · ∂(
2z∗
1 + s )/∂s+
∫ 2z∗
1+s
0
m
2 · f(m)dm
− z∗f( 2z
∗
1 + s ) · ∂(
2z∗
1 + s )/∂s+
∫ ∞
2z∗
1+s
∂z∗
∂s
· f(m)dm
=
∫ 2z∗
1+s
0
m
2 · f(m)dm+
∫ ∞
2z∗
1+s
∂z∗
∂s
· f(m)dm
From Proposition 7 we know that z∗ is increasing in s. Hence we obtain that ∂EM [S]
∂s
> 0, which indicates that
the total sale is increasing in the donor’s subsidy s. With the objective function EM [S] and the total subsidy
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cost s ·EM [S] both increasing in s, we know that the optimal solution will be achieved at the binding budget
constraint. With the binding budget constraint, we know that when the budget K increase, the optimal s∗ will
increase.
By taking the first order derivative of the subsidy cost s · EM [S] with respect to z∗, we get ∂(s·EM [S])∂z∗ = s ·
(
∫∞
2z
1+s
f(m)dm)> 0, from which we know the cost is increasing in z∗. As we have shown in Proposition 7 that z∗
is decreasing in the wholesale price w, we obtain that the cost is decreasing in w. To ensure budget constraint
is binding, we get that when w increases, the optimal s∗ will increase.
Proof of Proposition 9 By taking the second order derivative of EM [Πr(m)], we get:
∂E2M [Πr(m)]
∂z21
= ∂M1
∂z1
· 0 +
∫ ∞
M1
(−2(δ− 1)
mδ
) · f(m)dm< 0,
from which we know the retailer’s expected profit by selling product 1 is a concave function of z1. By consid-
ering the first order condition, we obtain that the optimal ordering decision for product 1 (i.e., z∗1) satisfies∫∞
2z∗1 (δ−1)
δs1+w2−s2
[−2(δ−1)z
∗
1
mδ
+ δs1−s2+w2
δ
] · f(m)dm−w1 = 0.
We use g(z1, s1, s2,w1,w2) to represent
∫∞
2z1(δ−1)
δs1+w2−s2
[−2(δ−1)z1
mδ
+ δs1−s2+w2
δ
] · f(m)dm − w1, and we have
shown that g(z∗1 , s1, s2,w1,w2) = 0. By taking the first order derivative of g(z1, s1, s2,w1,w2) with respect to
z1, s1, s2, w1, w2, we get:
∂g
∂z1
=
∫ ∞
M1
(−2(δ− 1)
mδ
) · f(m)dm< 0, ∂g
∂s1
=
∫ ∞
M1
f(m)dm> 0,
∂g
∂s2
=
∫ ∞
M1
−1
δ
f(m)dm< 0, ∂g
∂w1
=−1< 0, ∂g
∂w2
=
∫ ∞
M1
1
δ
f(m)dm> 0
To ensure g(z∗1 , s1, s2,w1,w2) = 0, we can easily obtain that z∗1 is increasing s1 and w2, while is decreasing in s2
and w1.
Proof of Proposition 10 We use SS1(m) and SS2(m) to represent the total sales (i.e., S1 +S2) under cases
when m≤M1 and m≥M1, respectively; and we have SS1(M1) = SS2(M1). By taking the first order derivative
of EM [S1 +S2] with respect to s, we obtain:
∂EM [S1 +S2]
∂s
=∂M1
∂s
·SS1(M1) · f(M1) +
∫ M1
0
m
2 · f(m)dm
− ∂M1
∂s
·SS2(M1) · f(M1) +
∫ ∞
M1
(∂z
∗
1
∂s
+ m2δ ) · f(m)dm
=
∫ M1
0
m
2 · f(m)dm+
∫ ∞
M1
(∂z
∗
1
∂s
+ m2δ ) · f(m)dm
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When s1 = s2 = s, we know that the optimal order quantity z∗1 satisfies g(z∗1 , s,w1,w2) =
∫∞
2z∗1 (δ−1)
δs+w2−s
[−2(δ−1)z1
mδ
+
δs−s+w2
δ
] · f(m)dm−w1 = 0. By taking the first order derivative of g(·), we find that ∂g∂z1 < 0 and
∂g
∂s
> 0, from
which we can further know z∗1 is increasing in s so as to ensure g(z∗1 , s,w1,w2) = 0. As z∗1 is increasing in s, we
can obtain that the total expected sales is increasing in s (i.e., ∂EM [S1+S2]
∂s
> 0). Moreover, it is obvious that the
total expense EM [s · (S1 +S2)] = s ·EM [S1 +S2] is also increasing in s. Hence we know that the optimal per unit
subsidy s∗ should satisfy the binding budget constraint.
Proof of Proposition 11 By taking the first order derivative of EM [Πr1(M)] with respect to z1, we get:
∂EM [Πr1(m)]
∂z1
=∂M2
∂z1
·Πr1,1(M2) · f(M2) +
∫ M2
0
(−w1) · f(m)dm
− ∂M2
∂z1
·Πr1,2(M2) · f(M2) +
∫ ∞
M2
[− 4(δ− 1)
m(2δ− 1) · z1 +
δ− 1− (s2−w2)
2δ− 1 + s1−w1] · f(m)dm
=−w1 +
∫ ∞
M2
[− 4(δ− 1)
m(2δ− 1) · z1 +
δ− 1− (s2−w2)
2δ− 1 + s1] · f(m)dm
By checking the second order derivative of EM [Πr1(m)], we obtain:
∂2EM [Πr1 (m)]
∂z21
= δ−12δ−1 · [ 1δ · f(M2) −
4
∫∞
M2
1
m
f(m)dm]< 0 when 1
δ
·f(M2)< 4
∫∞
M2
1
m
f(m)dm. Hence we know that EM [Πr1(M)] is a concave function
of z1; and we can obtain Proposition 11 by considering the first order condition.
Proof of Proposition 12 By taking the first order derivative of EM [S1 +S2] with respect to s, we get:
∂EM [S1 +S2]
∂s
=
∫ M2
0
1 + 2δ
4δ− 1 ·m · f(m)dm+
∫ ∞
M2
[ 2(δ− 1)2δ− 1 ·
∂z∗1
∂s
+ m2δ− 1 ] · f(m)dm
From Proposition 11, we know that −w1 +
∫∞
M2
[− 4(δ−1)
m(2δ−1) · z∗1 + δ−1−(s2−w2)2δ−1 + s1] · f(m)dm = 0. Hence when
s1 = s2 = s, we denote g(s, z1) =−w1 +
∫∞
M2
[− 4(δ−1)
m(2δ−1) · z∗1 + δ−1−(s−w2)2δ−1 + s] · f(m)d and we know g(s, z∗1) = 0. It
is easy to check that ∂g
∂z
< 0 and ∂g
∂s
> 0, from which we can obtain that z∗1 is increasing in s so as to ensure
g(s, z∗1) = 0. With
∂z∗1
∂s
> 0, we can show ∂EM [S1+S2]
∂s
> 0. Therefore, we obtain that both the objective function
and the subsidy cost shown in the donor’s problem (44) is increasing in s, from which we know that the budget
constraint should be binding at the optimal solution.
